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I. INTRODUCTION THE LONG-PURSE theory of predation, originally proposed by
, states that an incumbent firm with extensive internal financing may prey upon a rival with limited resources until these resources are exhausted, the rival exits the market, and the incumbent is left to earn monopoly profits. Early theoretical work demonstrated that long-purse predation may be rational for the incumbent if capital markets are imperfect.1 Recent work has explored the strategic role of financial contracts as predation deterrents. For example, the entrant and a lender may pursue a "deep-pocket" strategy, agreeing to finance continued production by the entrant even if the incumbent's predation drastically reduces the entrant's revenue (Tirole [1988] ). Alternatively, they may pursue a "shallow-pocket" strategy, reducing the probability that continued production is financed (making the entrant likely to exit the market in any event), thereby reducing the incumbent's incentives to prey (Bolton and Scharfstein [1990] [1995] show that asymmetric information between the contracting parties may prevent efficient renegotiation, in which case contracts may retain some commitment power. In the present paper, the contract may retain commitment power even though information is symmetric at the time of renegotiation. A similar idea is developed in Bensaid and Gary-Bobo [1993] : if utility is not freely-transferable between contracting parties, renegotiation may be limited. In the model considered here, the fact that utility is not freely-transferable is a natural result of the capital-market imperfections.
II. CONTRACTING WITHOUT RENEGOTIATION
As a benchmark, we review the model and results of Bolton and Scharfstein [1990] , supposing that renegotiation is ruled out for exogenous reasons. Two firms-an incumbent and an entrant-compete on the product market. The incumbent has unlimited access to internal financing. The entrant has no retained earnings and so must rely on financing from an external investor, called a lender. Assume that the market interest rate (determining the lender's cost of funds) is zero. The timing of the model is given in Figure 1 . There are three periods. Period 0 is a contracting stage during which the lender and entrant may sign a long-term financial contract. An important assumption maintained throughout is that the contract is observable to the incumbent and thus has some potential commitment value.3 The first and second periods are production stages. In each of these periods, a firm must expend sunk cost F in order to produce. Next, profits are realized; and then the terms of any financial contracts are enforced. We will suppose that production is a 3Bolton and Scharfstein discuss the case of unobservable contracts in their Section IIB. Under the assumption 7rL < F, unobservable contracts are never successful in deterring predation.
? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996. positive net present value investment for the incumbent whether or not the entrant remains in the market. Since it has unlimited access to internal financing, the incumbent always invests. Its only decision is whether or not to prey on the entrant, a decision that is made after the sunk investment has been expended in the first period.4
II(i). Predation Is Not Possible
Suppose for now that the incumbent cannot prey on the entrant. If the entrant invests in a given production period, it earns a random level of profit depending on demand and cost conditions. Profits can be low, TCL, with probability 0 or high, 7tH, with probability 1 -0. Profits are independently distributed across periods. Assume that the investment loses money with positive probability, TCL < F, but that the net present value of investment is positive; i.e., i > F where it -OTL + (1 -0)rH. Under these assumptions, if the entrant could finance itself using internal funds, it would invest each period. The entrant is assumed to have no internal funds, however, so it must borrow F from the lender. Any returns in excess of 7rL are "consumed" by the entrant-i.e., diverted to other projects or to non-pecuniary benefits. A capital-market imperfection is generated by assuming that the amount consumed is private information for the entrant, not subject to verification by the lender or courts.5 Any profits not consumed are verifiable.6 It should be emphasized that 7rL can always be extracted from the firm; only the residual lCH -lCL is consumed by the entrant (and that only in high-profit states).
Given our assumptions about the capital market, it is clear that the lender would never finance the entrant's investment in a one-period model. The entrant would claim that its profits were low, repaying the lender at most lCL and consuming any remainder. The repayment would be less than the amount lent initially, and so the lender would lose money. Long-term 4In the model, there is no reason for the entrant to prey since the incumbent always remains in the market. There is also no strategic reason for the incumbent to prey in the last period.
5Another way of stating the assumption is that auditing costs are infinite. Snyder [1994] analyzes a costly-state-verification model allowing for finite auditing costs.
6 These assumptions differ slightly from the original Bolton-Scharfstein model. There the authors do not consider the idea of consumption by the entrant; they simply suppose that the entire residual 7rH -7rL cannot be verified. I am grateful to a referee for pointing out a possible problem that would arise under those assumptions. After earning 7rH, the entrant could under-report profit and use the residual 7rH -7rL to fund investment partially, borrowing the remainder F -(rH -7L) from an outside lender. As long as the entrant can sign contracts with outside lenders (or make renegotiation offers to the original lender), such a strategy would be a profitable deviation from truth-telling in Bolton and Scharfstein. Such a strategy would be impossible under the assumptions considered in the present paper, however; here the residual 7rH -7L must be consumed by the entrant or else be subject to confiscation by the lender; in either case the residual cannot be used to fund second-period investment. In all other respects the two models are the same and produce the same results.
329
(here, two-period) financial contracts are feasible in this model; intuitively, the entrant is induced to repay its first-period loan fully in order to be refinanced in the second period.
Formally, a contract is a direct-revelation mechanism specifying parameters ri, Pi and Rij. The lender funds the entrant's initial investment F. After profit ir, (i = L, H) is realized, the entrant announces this level to the lender. Parameter ri is the first-period payment from the entrant to the lender conditional on announcement 7i. Conditional on the announcement of first-period profit, fPi E [0, 1] is the probability that the lender finances the entrant's second-period production, giving the firm F dollars at the beginning of the period.7 We suppose that the lender has access to a public randomizing device to allow for refinancing probabilities strictly within the unit interval. Ri3 is the repayment from the entrant to the lender at the end of the second period conditional on the announcement of ni for firstperiod profit and 7t1 for second-period profit. It is immediately obvious that Rij cannot vary with the second-period announcement or else the entrant would state the profit giving the lowest repayment level. Hence we can write the second-period repayment level as Ri, depending on the firstperiod profit announcement only.
Bolton and Scharfstein assume that the lender makes a take-it-orleave-it offer to the entrant at the contracting stage. For the sake of comparison, we continue this assumption here; Section IV works out the case in which the entrant has all the bargaining power at the contracting stage. The optimal contract for the lender solves the following program, called MAXI:
( The intuition for the proof is straightforward. Reducing JBL to zero has two benefits. It saves the lender from refinancing the entrant (recall the highest second-period repayment from entrant to the lender is 7rL, less than the cost of investment F), and it relaxes the entrant's incentivecompatibility constraint (2). Increasing JBH to 1 also relaxes (2). It requires the lender to refinance the entrant with certainty; but since investment has a positive net present value, this cost can be more than offset by an increase in rH. Condition (6) can be easily derived: it simply requires the lender to earn non-negative profit under the optimal contract.
11(ii). Predation Is Possible
Proposition A suggests a motivation for predation by the incumbent. The entrant's continued existence in the second-period market depends on its first-period profits. If the incumbent can reduce this profit through predation, it may induce the entrant to exit the market, leaving the incumbent as a monopolist.
That the lender always loses money in the second period (true since RN = rL <F) is not an essential feature of the model. It is an artifact of the assumption, made for simplicity, that profits are identically distributed in the first and second periods. Consider an extension of the model in which second-period profits are X1rL and XnrH, where the scaling factor x E (0, oo) is a random variable which has mean x and which is realized after second-period investment F is sunk. In this setting, general contracts can specify a second-period repayment that is a function of x, i.e., Ri(x) (i = L, H). It can be shown that, as long as x lies in a certain interval around 1, the propositions of the present paper extend naturally to this new variant. In particular, the optimal contract sets R2(x) = RN(x) = X1rL. If x is high enough (namely, x > F/0L), the lender can earn a positive profit in the second period.
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Let the incumbent's expected profit as a monopolist be ntm and as a duopolist be 7rd. Predation is modeled in a fairly general way: at a cost of c, the incumbent can increase the probability that the entrant's profits are low, from 0 to ,u. Given parameters (PL, fH) specified by a general financial contract, the incumbent's benefit from predation is (PH -fL) ( Notice that the financial contract can deter predation if the difference between PH and f3L is sufficiently small. Unfortunately for the lender, the optimal contract in the absence of predation specifies the maximum possible value Of PH -1kL namely 1H -#L = 1. In the words of Bolton and Scharfstein, "the contract that minimizes agency problems, maximizes the rival's incentive to prey."
To make the problem interesting, assume that A < 1 so that the optimal contract when predation is not possible does not trivially deter predation. Suppose first that it is not optimal for the lender and entrant to deter predation with their financial contract. In this case, the program giving the optimal contract is the same as MAX1 except that 0 is replaced everywhere by ,u. Thus the optimal contract is identical to that in Proposition A replacing 0 with ,u; in particular, (PL, flH) = (0, 1).
Suppose that the lender and entrant wish to deter predation with their financial contract. In this case, the program giving the optimal contract is the same as MAXI with the addition of a "no-predation" constraint: 
Proof. Bolton and Scharfstein [1990], Lemma 2 and Proposition 2.10
Interestingly, in the absence of renegotiation, the optimal predationdeterring contract reduces the probability that second-period production is refinanced. The optimal contract that deters predation specifies PH = A < 1; the optimal contract that does not deter predation specifies #H= 1. Rather than an aggressive strategy committing the entrant and lender to finance the project even in unfavorable states, the parties pursue a "shallow-pocket" strategy. We will see in the next section that this result is not robust once renegotiation is considered.
III. CONTRACTING WITH RENEGOTIATION
We next examine a model identical to that in Section II with the addition of a renegotiation stage. There are many alternative formulations of renegotiation. For purposes of exposition, we will focus on the case in which the lender makes a take-it-or-leave-it renegotiation offer after the incumbent makes its predation decision but before the entrant learns the value of first-period profit. This case maintains the assumption that the lender has all the bargaining power throughout the course of the game. The results are robust to alternative formulations of renegotiation.'1 Clearly, renegotiation plays no role if, as in Section 11(i), the incumbent cannot engage in predation for exogenous reasons, for then the lender offers the entrant the most efficient contract possible conditional on period-O information at the outset. The same can be said of the case in which the optimal contract does not deter predation [i.e., the case in which A(1 -0) < 1 -p]. Renegotiation only matters if the incumbent can prey on the entrant and if the optimal contract is designed to deter predation. In this case, the extra constraint (7) is added to the program to affect the actions of the incumbent. But extra constraints are expensive: once the incumbent's actions are sunk, the lender and entrant may wish to design a more profitable contract, removing (7).
Indeed, the predation-deterring contract from Proposition B would be renegotiated. The lender could offer a contract that increases PH and also '0Although the results in Bolton and Scharfstein are correct, the proofs appear to omit some steps. In particular, their Lemma 2, proved for the case without predation, is taken to apply directly to the predation case as well. It is not immediate that the lemma holds in the predation case since the maximization program giving the optimal contract differs depending on the existence of predation. Therefore, if the period-O contract is given by Proposition B, we have shown that the lender would benefit from offering a new contract in the renegotiation stage. Intuitively, raising PH increases the joint surplus of the entrant and lender: joint surplus is given by the sum of (1) and (5), which simple calculations show is proportional to (9) 0fL + (1 -0)#H As long as surplus is freely transferable from the entrant to the lender, the lender will wish to raise the refinancing probabilities as high as possible. Following a high-profit realization, the limited-liability constraint (4) is slack since the high type earns more than it needs to repay the lender; i.e., JCH > rH. Thus surplus is freely transferable in this case, and so the lender would raise PH and rH in a renegotiation offer. The same argument does not apply to fL. Following a low-profit realization, the entrant's limited-liability constraint binds; and so utility is not freely transferable from the entrant to the lender. If the lender raises PL, it cannot increase rL to compensate, since rL = 7rL already and no more than 7rL can be extracted from the entrant in the second period. 12 The reasoning from the preceding paragraph can be extended to show that any contract specifying PH < 1 would be renegotiated, so the resulting contract after renegotiation must specify refinancing with certainty if first-period profit is 7rH. 13 But then the "shallow-pocket" strategy of predation-deterrence cannot be credible: the incumbent would have an incentive to increase the probability that first-period profit is low, for only in this event can it become a monopoly. Formally, we have the following proposition: The main result contained in Propositions C and D is that long-term financial contracts can still deter predation in spite of the existence of renegotiation. Renegotiation does, however, erode the commitment value of contracts: in the presence of renegotiation there is less first-period investment, lower lender profit, and more predation than in the absence of renegotiation.
It is obvious that lender profit falls in the presence of renegotiation since renegotiation is equivalent to adding the constraint fP. = 1 to the lender's maximization program. In contrast, the joint surplus of the entrant and lender may be higher in the presence of renegotiation than in the absence.
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A(1-0)>max|1-,+p, 1 _ P implying that the entrant and lender sign a predation-deterring contract when predation is a possibility. Then the entrant and lender's joint surplus is given by (9); i.e., joint surplus is determined solely by the probability of refinancing. But the probability of refinancing is higher in the regime with possible predation and renegotiation (the regime associated with Proposition C) than in either the regime with possible predation and no renegotiation (the regime associated with Proposition B) or the regime with no predation (the regime associated with Proposition A). Thus, as long as (11) holds, the potential for predation and renegotiation can increase expected joint surplus.14 By subtracting the lender's surplus from the joint surplus, it follows that renegotiation and possible predation can increase the entrant's surplus as well. The surprising result that possible predation and renegotiation may increase the entrant's surplus and the joint surplus of the entrant and the lender is due to the fact that utility is not freely transferable from the entrant to the lender. Utility is not freely transferable in the sense that the capital-market imperfections prevent the lender from extracting all the entrant's surplus. Specifically, the limited-liability constraint prevents the lender from extracting any more than XL following a low-profit realization in the second period; the informational asymmetry prevents the lender from extracting any more than lrL following a high-profit realization in the second period. Since the lender cannot extract all of the entrant's surplus, the entrant's surplus represents an externality in the lender's maximization program. Hence, the lender's optimum may not maximize joint surplus; any constraints that are imposed on the lender's optimization program may move the solution in the direction of increasing the entrant's surplus and joint surplus. Indeed, if (11) holds, predation and renegotiation effectively impose lower bounds on the refinancing probabilities (1L > PH -A and PH > 1, respectively); in view of (9), the resulting rise in the refinancing probabilities increases joint surplus.
IV. ENTRANT BARGAINING POWER
Thus far, we have supposed that the lender makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a financial contract in the period-O contracting stage to the entrant, in 14It is quite possible that a similar result holds regarding social welfare as well. The probability that the entrant continues in the market-the probability that the industry remains a duopoly rather than becoming a monopoly-is highest in the regime with renegotiation and predation. Under many standard models of competition, social welfare is higher in a duopoly than in a monopoly. Hence, the presence of predation and renegotiation may actually increase social welfare. effect giving all of the bargaining power to the lender. In this section, we examine the robustness of the results under the alternative assumption that the entrant has all the bargaining power. The assumption that the entrant makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the lender in the period-O contracting stage is consistent with the existence of a competitive lending sector: competition would drive the lenders to offer a contract that maximizes the entrant's surplus subject to a break-even constraint for the lender. 15 Label the new program giving the optimal contract MAX2: It is instructive to compare the results from the previous sections to the results assuming that the entrant makes the contract offer. The differences in the two sets of results stem from the fact that the lender has no liquidity constraint, so it can transfer utility freely to the entrant, implying that the lender's individual-rationality constraint can be made to bind when the entrant makes the contract offer. Therefore, the entrant's objective function fully internalizes joint surplus; the contract that maximizes entrant surplus maximizes the joint surplus of the entrant and lender as well.
An immediate result is that joint surplus is higher when the entrant has the bargaining power. Calculations similar to those accompanying expression (9) show that joint surplus is proportional to the probability of refinancing. Hence, a second result is that the probability of refinancing is higher when the entrant makes the contract offer. This second result can be combined with the fact, proved in the appendix, that there is the same amount of first-period investment whether the lender or the entrant makes the contract offer. Taken together, we see that there is more total investment when the entrant makes the contract offer. A fourth result is that joint surplus and the entrant's surplus no longer rise with the existence 15For continuity with the previous section, we will continue to suppose that the lender has the bargaining power at the renegotiation stage. As argued in the previous section, the results would be identical if the entrant had the power at the renegotiation stage. 
V. CONCLUSION
Four main conclusions should be highlighted. First, long-term financial contracts can function as credible predation defenses in spite of renegotiation; however, renegotiation impairs the commitment value of contracts. This result is robust to changes in how the capital-market imperfections are modeled: Snyder [1994] shows that it emerges from an analysis of a costly-state-verification model. Second, the strategy implied by the optimal contract has intuitive appeal that may have been lacking from the existing theory. Renegotiation forces the entrant and lender to pursue a "deep-pocket" strategy, committing the lender to increase the probability that the entrant is refinanced in the face of predation. By contrast, the optimum in Bolton and Scharfstein [1990] involves a "shallow-pocket" strategy, a reduction in the probability of refinancing in the face of predation. Third, we have the striking result that the presence of predation may increase the entrant's surplus and the joint surplus of the lender and entrant. This result depends on the parameters of the model and on the assumption that the lender has bargaining power at the ? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996. contracting stage. If the concentration of the credit market is a measure of the bargaining power of the lender, the result would be a characteristic of concentrated rather than competitive credit markets. Fourth, the entrant's surplus, joint surplus, and the probability of refinancing are all higher when the entrant-the party faced with a limited-liability constraint-makes the initial contract offer than when the lender does.16
The paper contributes to the literature on contract renegotiation by demonstrating a model in which renegotiation between symmetricallyinformed parties does not destroy the commitment value of contracts. In other models (see Dewatripont [1988] and the discussion in Bolton [1990] In the text, we showed that a renegotiation-proof contract must specify AH = 1. A financial contract can be designed either to deter predation or not to deter predation. We treat the two designs in turn. First, consider the optimal contract that does not deter predation. It was argued above that this contract would not be renegotiated, so its form is given by Proposition B.
16 Petersen and Rajan [1995] provide some empirical verification of these results in their study of 3,000 small US businesses. Young firms in unconcentrated credit markets (markets in which these firms presumably have bargaining power as borrowers) are found to have significantly higher gross-profit ratios than those in concentrated markets. The proportion of firms with financing from outside lenders grows faster with age in unconcentrated credit markets. One finding not captured in the model is that the proportion of young firms receiving financing from outside lenders is lower in unconcentrated markets-the model would predict no significant difference-providing evidence of the adverse-selection effects outlined by Petersen and Rajan.
? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996. Consider, then, the optimal predation-deterring contract. First, it is obvious that (7) must bind; so /3H = 1 and fL = 1 -A. Second, it is a simple matter to verify that Lemma 1 from Bolton and Scharfstein carries over to this case, implying that the incentive-compatibility constraint (2) The entrant may elect to accommodate predation with the optimal contract. Then, the optimal contract would be as in Case 1, with p substituted for 0. This form of contract exists as long as fl* > 0; i.e., as long as rL-F + (1 -it) (i -F) > 0. The expected surplus for the entrant can be computed and compared to that from the solution above to determine which strategy, accommodation or deterrence, is pursed at an optimum. The condition guaranteeing the entrant receives financing in the first period reduces to (8).
Case 3: Possible Predation; Renegotiation. As argued in the proof of Proposition C, any contract with 13H < 1 would be renegotiated, replaced by a contract with fH = 1. To deter predation, then, a renegotiation-proof contract would need to specify PH = 1 and f#L> 1 -A. As shown in Case 2 above, such a contract also satisfies the rest of the constraints if and only if (A8) is violated. If (A8) does not hold, we showed that the optimal contract is identical to that found in Case 1; in particular, it deters predation.
If ( For predation-deterrence in the presence of renegotiation, (A8) must be violated. This is not a necessary condition for predation-deterrence in the absence of renegotiation. Thus it is more difficult to deter predation under renegotiation.
Next, we demonstrate a case in which the probability of refinancing is greater under renegotiation. Suppose the parameters are such that the entrant is just indifferent between deterring and accommodating predation in Case 2. Let the superscript d refer to the optimum in the deterrence case and a refer to the optimum in the accommodation case. As shown above, (13) binds; substituting ( By continuity, there exist parameter values such that the entrant strictly prefers deterrence, but (AIO) still holds. Suppose in addition that (A8) holds. Then under no renegotiation (Case 2), the entrant strictly prefers deterrence; while under renegotiation (Case 3), the entrant accommodates. By (AIO) the probability of refinancing is greater under renegotiation than under no renegotiation. It is obvious that renegotiation reduces the entrant's expected surplus. Renegotiation is equivalent to adding a constraint to the entrant's program MAX2. Since (13) binds, the lender makes zero profit. The entrant and lender's joint expected surplus thus equals the entrant's expected surplus. It follows that renegotiation reduces joint surplus as well.
